Sumário analítico fabuloso da Forbes

Los Estados Unidos
We're On Top
Tunku Varadarajan 09.22.08, 12:00 AM ET

Starting today, the United Nations' headquarters in New York turns into a caravanserai for the world's presidents, prime ministers and panjandrums. They're all gathered to debate--quaint word, that--the globe's several disgruntlements. The General Assembly of the U.N. was conceived as the Great Equalizer, the forum in which all states big and small would have but one vote each. This "vote" was a political inversion of "veto," the device--so useful when we wield it, so infuriating when the Chinese or Russians do--that makes the U.N.'s Security Council the Great Un-equalizer. This one-size-fits-all vote was a recipe, of course, for the General Assembly's rapid redundancy--and for its becoming little better than a venue for off-off-off-Broadway theater. The world is unequal: always has been, always will be. And in order to understand the hierarchy of the world as it is, I offer a back-of-the-envelope taxonomy that should help us stack countries from top to bottom.
Alpha: At the top is America, dubbed memorably (and accurately) an "hyperpuissance" by Hubert Vedrine, a former foreign minister of France. This phrase--hyperpower--is France's only indisputably useful contribution to international relations in well over a decade. (Josef Joffe's locution, "Uber-power," adds nothing to the conversation, being merely German translation masquerading as fresh insight.) America, in spite of the plummeting of its stock under President Bush, is Alpha without equal; and I mean this observationally, not as triumphal judgment. Superpowers: Who's next? This is a small category, confined to those who wield a veto in the U.N.'s Security Council, but who lack the political heft to assemble armed international coalitions in the absence of a U.N. imprimatur. These would be Britain, China, France and Russia, and each has the ability to manage a "sphere," should it so choose, independent of American oversight--and contrary to American interests. Britain has, effectively, opted out of exercising this choice, of which Russia and China are emphatic exercisers; France cannot seem to make up its mind. Always-Consequential States: These differ from the previous category essentially in their lack of a U.N. veto, as well as in their inability to use force internationally without clearing it first--at some level--with Washington. These states are Germany, Japan and India. Although the economies of Germany and Japan are drivers of the international economy on a par with some of the countries higher up in the hierarchy, their ability to project armed force beyond their borders is virtually nonexistent. India is of growing strategic and military stature, but its force-projection is hampered by an economy that is still Not Quite There--and by a political self-image that makes it a more diffident international actor than it needs to be. All of these states aspire to a U.N. veto--and few other states regard this aspiration as frivolous.
Not-Inconsequential States: These states are always taken into account seriously--and not merely ritually--by other states, as well as by international institutions. Not-inconsequential states include Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden and Turkey. This list is not exhaustive, and the boundary between this and the next category is often blurred by specific events and interests. (A subset within this category might be that of the Never-Inconsequential State, with a membership of one: Israel. Its ability to act in forcible ways that have major international consequences goes well beyond that of the other states in this category, none of which enjoys the unconditional support of the United States the way Israel does.)
Inconsequential, but Reputable: These are states that trouble no one, and seldom if ever cause deliberate disruption to the flow of international relations. Their conduct, on the whole, makes them reputable; their inability to influence international currents except in coalition with others makes them independently largely inconsequential. Examples include such states as Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzerland and Thailand.
Disreputable, but Not Inconsequential: A state is often regarded only as highly as one regards the regime running it. By this token, disreputability is a fluid category: A state so classified today might find itself elevated to "Reputable" status after a change of regime. The states in this category are "not inconsequential" by virtue of their ability to make mischief--often potentially serious mischief--beyond their own borders; and so the world ignores them at its peril. These states are, at present, Iran, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan and Venezuela.
Disreputable and Inconsequential: This is a sad category--and sad, in the main, for the citizens of the states in question: Myanmar, Cuba and Zimbabwe. Myanmar is enslaved by unyielding generals who will not hand over power to an elected stateswoman. After its adventurist heyday, Cuba is now a pathetic, down-at-heel, repressive island-prison. And Zimbabwe is a beastly place, where hunger-struck people are presided over by a benighted megalomaniac. None of this, however, affects anyone else, except emotionally--which is why the tyrants in all three places can go, blithely, about their business ... including business at the U.N. General Assembly.
Tunku Varadarajan, a professor at NYU's Stern Business School and a fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, is opinions editor at Forbes.com, where he writes a weekly column